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Towards a Predictive Theory of 
Intergovernmental Grants* 
By I)AV~D F. BRADFORD alzct  J i T E. OATES ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Princeton  Unhersity 
Until quite recently, theoretical analyses 
of  the impact of  intergovernmental grants 
on  public  expenditures  have  run  either 
implicitly  or  explicitly  in  terms  of  the 
familiar thcory of  indi~idual  choice.'  The 
recipient  ~f  the grant is typically viewed 
in efiect as an i~tdividual  decision maker 
with preference patterns of  the usual sort 
defined  over  private  and  public  goods. 
Within this theoretical structure,  a number 
of  propositions have  been  developed  in- 
cluding, for example, the conclusion that, 
dollar-for-dollar,  a  niatching  grant  will 
induce a greater expansion in spending on 
the public good than will a lump-sum, un-
conditional grant. 
The difficulty  with this analysis, as xe 
all have been v;ell  aware, is that this is not 
the appropriate theoretical framework for 
the  study  of  intergovernmental  grants. 
Such grants are not grants to individuals; 
they are grants to groups of  people.  This 
means  that  the  effects  of  these  grants 
depend  upon  the  process  by  which  the 
group  makes collertive  decisions.  A  real 
theory of  intergovernmental grants must, 
for  this  reason,  be  one  which  takes ex-
plicitly  into account the political process 
through which the collectivity determines 
its levels of  spending upon public goods. 
* The authors are grateful for  a number  of  helpful 
comments  to  the participants  in  economics  seminars 
at hfcMaster  University  and  at Rutgers University. 
In addition, they are indebted to the 1ord Foundation 
whose support has greatly facilitated this study. 
For an excellent presentation using  this approach, 
see James LViIde. 
In  OIIC recent paper, Goetz and McKnew 
have  shown  for  a  special  case  that it is 
COP ceivable  that  lump-sum  grants  can 
have  a  greater  stimulative  impact  on 
public  spending  than  an  equal-dollar 
matching  grant.  Using  a  rather  compli- 
cated model in which the collectivity de- 
cides separately on the aggregate level of 
public spending and on the mix of  public 
programs,  they  show  that, if  individual 
preferences bear a particular kind of  rela- 
tion to one another, simple majority voting 
will lead to greater public expenditure in 
response to a  lump-sum  grant than to a 
matching grant of  the same amount. 
Whether  this  special  case  is  likely  to 
occur tvith any frecluency is another mat- 
ter, but, at any rate, it is clear that one 
can concoct  particular instances in which 
a process of  collective decision making will 
lead to results which are at variance with 
the  conclusions  which  follomr  from  the 
model  of  individual  choice.  Our purpose 
in this paper is to try to explore somewhat 
more  systematically  the  eflects  of  these 
two types of  intergovernmental grants. 
The question  arises  whether there are 
interesting  classes  of  collective  decision 
processes for which the comparative effects 
of  the  two  types  of  intergovernmental 
grants  can  be  predicted.  In  an  earlier 
Paper  on revellue-sharing  (Bradford and 
Oates), \+-e halle  constructed a framework 
for  conceptualizing  collective budget  de- 
termination whjch offers the possibilit~~  of 
ilcaling  systematically with the effects of 
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intergovernmental  grants  under  varying 
sets of  assumptions about the nature of 
political processes and the range of  politi- 
cal  possibilities.  In that  paper,  we  ex-
amined  the  case  of  lump-sum  grants to 
collectivities,  and  we  succeeded  in  dis-
tinguishing  a  class  of  political  processes 
under  which  such  grants are  equivalent 
(both in terms of  their allocative and dis- 
tributive effects) to a set of  grants directly 
to the individual members of  the collec- 
tivity. In this paper, we  explore the appli- 
cation of  this same approach to a compari- 
son of  the effects of  lump-sun1 and match- 
ing grants to political units. 
In  section  I, we  provide  a  brief  re-
capitulation of  the theory of  intergovern- 
mental grants in  ternls  of  the  standard 
model  of  individual  choice.  This,  as  it 
turns out, proves to be of  some value for 
the case of  collective choice as well.  Sec- 
tion  I1  describes  the  conceptual  frame- 
work  for  analyzing processes of  collective 
choice  that  ~q-e  developed  in  our  earlier 
paper  and  indicates the relevance  of  the 
basic theorem  proved  there  to the prob- 
lem  under study here. In section 111, we 
use this framework to analyze the alloca- 
tiye  and distributive efiects of  lump-sum 
and of  matching intergovernn2ectal grants 
where  the  collectivity  makes  its  fiscal 
decisiolis  by  simple  majority  rule.  I11 
particular,  we  prove  that, under  simple 
majority rule with fixed tax shares and a 
single public good,  a matching grant will 
always lead to a larger public expenditure 
than will  a lump-sum  grant of  the same 
amount. In conclusion  in  section  IV, we 
speculate on the prospects for generalizing 
this result. 
I. Intergorernnzental  grant^ in a 

Model cj' Indinidual Ckoice 

In  this approach, the recipient  of  the 
grant is typically  assumed to be  311 indi-
vidual decision maker with convex prefer- 
erlccs defined over quailtities of  a private 
good  and a public good  as in Figure 
To simplify the analysis we  assume that 
units of  both goods are chosen such that 
the price of  the public good in terms of  the 
private good is unity. 
Private  1 Good 
Public 
Good 
Subject to a pre-grant budget constraint 
of  AB,  the community selects an output of 
the public  good  of  OGo which  leaves OP 
to be consumed in the form of  the private 
good.  Assume  ~rxt  that the community 
is the recipient  of  a matching-grant  pro- 
gram:  the  central  government,  for  ex-
ample.  might  agree  to share the cost  of 
providing the local public good by funding 
a specified percentage of  the community's 
expenditure on the good. In terms of  Fig-
ure 1,such a grant pivots the community's 
budget  constraint  outward  about  the 
point A  to reflect what is now in effect a 
lower unit price of  the public good to the 
local community. As a result, provision of 
the public good in  Figure  1 rises to OG1, 
and the community receives a grant of  DE. 
Suppose,  however,  that  instead  of  a 
matching grant of  DE, the grantor chose 
to give the community a lump-sum grant 
of  the same amount. Such a  grant would 
?Alternatively,  one  might  assume  that  Figure  1 
represents community indifference curves. The diflicul- 
ties associated with such curves are such, hov-ever, as to 
render them of  dubious value, particularly for predict- 
ing the effects of  government grants. AMERICAN  ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 

shift  the community's  budget  constraint 
outward  to FH  but would  not  alter the 
relative  prices  of  the private  and public 
goods. Moreover, it is clear from Figure 1 
that the matching grant  would  induce  a 
smaller increase in spending on the public 
good than would the matching grant; since 
FH passes through E  but is steeper than 
AC, it  follows,  given  normal  convexity 
properties of  the preference map, that the 
tangency of  FEI  with an indifference curve 
must lie to the left of  E. Or, in economic 
terms, the lump-sum  grant induces more 
expenditure on the public good because it 
not  only  enriches  the  community  (i.e., 
has an income effect), but in  addition re- 
duces the price of  the public good to the 
recipient  ji.e.,  has a  substitution efiect). 
In the individual model, a matching grant 
thus possesses a greater stimulating effect 
on public spending than does a lump-sum 
grant of  the same amount. We now turn to 
a reconsideration of  the properties of  these 
grants in a framework tvith explicit collec- 
tive decision making. 
11.  Tlze Analytic Structure 
For simplicity, we will at this point con- 
tinue to use  a model in which  there is a 
single pure  public good, a single private 
good, and a given  and constant price  of 
each  where  the units  of  these  goods are 
defined  such that the price  of  the public 
good in tern~s  of  the private good is unity. 
\Ve  need  next  to describe  in  conceptual 
terms the local community and its political 
process. Briefly, we represent what we will 
call the state oj' the contmz~nitjl  by a vector 
[?'I,  ~2, - . - yn, g],  whose  first  n  compo-
nents indicate the disposable incomes (or 
claims to the private good) of  each of  the n 
members of  the community and whose last 
component, g, is the number of  units of  the 
public good.  ?'he  set  of  feasible  states  of 
the collectivjty represents the conln~unity's 
budget constraint; for each total quantity 
of  the private good available for distribu- 
tion  among  the  members  of  the  com-
munity, the boundary of  this set indicates 
the  maximum  level  of  provision  of  the 
public good  attainable. 
Not  all  feasible  states  for  the  com-
munity,  however,  will  be  political  equi- 
libria.  A  state, for  example,  in  which  all 
the community's  resources were used  for 
provision of  the public good would prob- 
a,bly  generate  political  pressures  which 
would  lead  to  another  state  in  which 
members  of  the  community  would  con-
sume  a  positive  quantity  of  the private 
good. In this framework, we can view the 
political process (or the rule for collective 
decision  making)  as  the  mechanism 
through which one feasible state is trans- 
formed into another (possibly  itself). For 
a given set of  feasible states, a political pro- 
cess thus defines for each initial feasible 
state the resulting equilibrium state;  it is a 
mapping which indicates how the political 
process transforms each state of  the corn- 
munity into an equilibrium state. Kote in 
particular  that,  starting  from  a  given 
feasible state, the political process simul- 
taneously  determines  both  the  level  of 
output  of  the public  good  and  the dis- 
posable  income  of  each  member  of  the 
community. 
From  this  perspective,  we  can  char-
acterize  a  grant to the community  as a 
disturbance  to  the  existing  equilibrium 
state and a change in the feasible set. We 
could think of  the grant as initially taking 
the form of  an increment to the level  of 
provision of the public good. However, this 
new state, which is itself  a member of  an 
enlarged set of feasible states, will not in 
general  represent  a political  equilibrium. 
It will itself  typically be  transformed by 
the political process into a new equilibrium 
state. 
We  have found  it extremely  useful  for 
analytic purposes to explore one particular 
question  relating  to the  response  of  the 
community  to n grant  program.  Specifi- 443  POLITICAL  DECENTRALIZ.4TION 
cally, we ask411  the case of  each grant to 
the community as a whole-(f  there is  some 
particular  way  the  grantor  might  have 
distributed  the  grant funds  directly  to  the 
indhidual  members  oj the  comnlunity  so 
that precisely  the same equilibrium state  of 
the comnzzrtzity  xlould  reszdf. If  this is the 
case, we can show that a particular inter- 
governnlental grant is precisely equivalent, 
both in  terms of  its ultimate  impact  on 
the provision  of  the public good  and on 
the disposable income of  each member of 
the community, to a  set  of  grants made 
directly to the individuals themselves. 
\Ye  find  (not  surprisingly)  that  the 
answer to this question depends upon the 
properties of  the political process, In our 
earlier paper, we developed a proposition 
for  lump-sum  grants which  may  be  de- 
scribed  briefly  as follotvs. Assume that a 
grant program to a community acts in the 
first  instance to increase  some  collective 
activity (where "holding  a cash balance in 
the public treasury" counts as a collective 
activity). In contrast, assume that each of 
the set of  grant programs to individuals 
which duplicates the effective set of  possi- 
bilities (i.e., the feasible set) generated by 
the grant to the collectivity, has the initial 
effect  of  simply increasing individual dis- 
posable incomes, leaving the levels of  the 
local  government  activities  ~nchanged.~ 
Then, our proposition states that, under a 
set of  suitable conditions  on the political 
process  (conditions discussed at length in 
our earlier  paper),  there is a program of 
grants to individuals which leads via  the 
political process to precisely the same equi- 
librium state of  the community as  does the 
grant to the c~llectivity.~ 
We could be compari~tg,  for example, a grant of  $1 
million  to  a  local  government which  initially sinlply 
increases  local public  revenues  to  a  set of  grants di- 
rectly  to  the  individual  members  of  the  community 
where the sum of  these latter grants is $1million. 
It  is interesting that the proof of  this proposition does 
not require that there exist any particular relationship 
betn een individual prcsferences and collecti~ e choice 
In the most general case, it is not pos- 
sible to derive the precise character of  this 
program of  individual grants. However, in 
particular cases in which the political pro- 
cess is specified  in some detail (as we will 
show in the next section), this can be done. 
Finally, and directly to the point  of  our 
study here, we have found that for certain 
cases,  we  can link  individual preferences 
and the implicit  set  of  individual  grants 
through the political process in a manner 
which  allows us to predict  the effects of 
changes in the form  of  the grant on the 
collective choice. And it is to this issue we 
turn now. 
111. Intergovernmentat Grants and 
Simple Majority Rule 
An important example in which we can 
employ our analytic  framework to  examine 
in some detail the effects of  different pro- 
grams of  intergovernmcr:tal grants is the 
case  where  the  community  makes  its 
collective fiscal decision by simple majority 
rule. More specifically, we will take as our 
model  a  community in  which  each indi- 
vidual's tax share is known and fixed and in 
which the level of  provision of  the public 
good is determined by a simple majority 
voting  rule.  Ry  this  we  mean  that the 
community votes on  adternative  pairs of 
provision  of  the public good  until one is 
found which at least ((n/2)+1) members 
of  the community prefer to any other. This 
model could represent, for example, a local 
school district which finances its expendi- 
tures through  a  local  property  tax  and 
which  en~ploys  majority  voting to deter- 
mine  the  annual school  budget.  In this 
instance,  each  individual's  tax  share  is 
defined by the assessed value of  his prop- 
erty divided by the total assessed value of 
taxable property  within  the district. His 
tax bill is then determined by the product 
of  his tax share and the size of  thc school 
budget selected by the electorate. 
Tn  Figure 2, we indicate the position of 444  XMERIC'XK  ECONOMIC  .4SSOCI:4TION 
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I:IGURE 2 
any individual (say the ith) member of the 
community.  Since  by  construction  the 
price per unit of  the public good in terms 
of  the private good is unity, the slope of 
his budget constraint, Ah',  is equal to his 
tax share, hi (i.e., the '(tax-price" to hinl 
of  a  unit  of  the public  good).  Assuming 
that each person's preference map exhibits 
indifference  curl-es of  the usual  shape, it 
follows that the preferences of  each mem- 
ber of  the community for the public good 
will be  single-peaked.  In terms of  Ti,  pure 
2 where OGi is the individual's most pre- 
ferred level of  provision of  the public good, 
this means that, hetxeen any two levels of 
the public good greater tl.i:~n OG,, he pre- 
fers the smaller of  the two  (i.e., the one 
closer to OGi). Similarly, for any two bud- 
gets less than OGi,  he  prefers the larger. 
With preferences which satisfy this prop- 
erty of  single-peakedness,  the theorcm of 
Duncan  Black  states that, under  simple 
majority  rule,  the equilibrium  budget  is 
the median peak, or  in other words, the 
median  of  the  most-preferred  levels  of 
provision  of  the public good. This means 
that,  aside  from  the  individual  who 
possesses the mediaxl peak, the equilibrium 
public  budget  will  not  be  that  budget 
which is most preferred by any given mem- 
ber  of  the community.  In Figure  2,  for 
example,  the  equilibrium  budget,  say 
OGo, will  in general differ  from  the indi- 
vidual's most preferred budget, OG,. 
Let us now  disturb the political  equi- 
libriunl  represented  in  Figure  2  by  tile 
introcluction  of  a  grant  program  to the 
community. 'lye consider first the case of 
a  lump-sum  grant  to  the  collectivity. 
Assume that the central government pro- 
vides the community with an unconditional 
grant of  a specified sum. In Figure  3, if 
the grant were ETI= BD!this v~oulti  imply 
that, if each member  of  the  community 
were to maintain his le17el  of  consumption 
of  the private good  at its previous equi- 
librium level, the output of  the public good 
could  increase  to  OG1,  or  by  the  full 
amount of  the grant. 'The full range, how-
Private  , 
I 
0  '  Public 
ever, of  alternative bundles of  private and 
public goods available to the ith individual 
is indicated by the new budget constraint, 
CD, and it is unlikely that the point H will 
represent  a  new  political  equilibrium. 
Suppose instead that, using majority rule, 
the  community  decides  to  increase  the 
public budget to OGz so as to increase also 
consamption  of  the  private  good.  In 
Figure 3, point Jby assumption thus indi- 
cates the new equilibrium provision of  the 
public good and the level of  private con- 
sumption, OP2,  of  individuzl i. 
'lVe now ask if, instead of  using an inter- 
governmental  grant,  the  grantor  could 
have  generated  thc identical  equilibrium 
state of  the community by parcelling out 
the grant funds directly to the individual 
members of  the comnlunity. The answer POLITICAI,  DECENTRALIZATION 

is yes. If, for example, the central govern- 
ment  had  given  person  i in  Figure  3  a 
lump-sum  grant  of  EF,  this  individual 
would have had precisely the same budget 
constraint, CD, as in the case of  the grant 
of  EII  to the collectivity. IT-ith the same 
budget  constraint and a given preference 
map, his  array of  preferences  for  public 
budgets  and  hence  his  voting  pattern 
would  be  exactly  the same  in  the  tu70 
cases. 
Xote next that (EF) =h,(EH), the grant 
to each individual, which from his position 
is  equivalent to the grant to the collec- 
tivity, is equal to the product of  his tax 
share  and  the  intergovernmental  grant. 
Moreover, since the tax shares (the hi) sum 
to one, it follows that the sum of  the grants 
to the individuals eq~nls  the amount of  the 
original  grant  to  the  collectivity.  This 
means  that,  if  the  central  government 
simply divides up the grant monies among 
the individuals in proportion to each per- 
son's  local  tax  share, precisely  the  same 
state of  the community  results as if  the 
total of  the grant funds were given to the 
public  treasury  of  the  community. 
lump-sum  grant to a  community  in  this 
model is, therefore, an implicit set of  grants 
to the members of  the community where 
each indi\~idual's  grant is proportional to 
his local tax share. 
Consider  next  the case  of  a.  matching 
grant to the community. In Figure 4 with 
AB again  possessing  slope  h, and  repre- 
senting the individual's pre-grant  budget 
constraint and with Gothe original equi- 
librium public budget, the grant pivots the 
individual's  budget line about point A  to 
AC.  Xote  that  the  slope  of  AC  is 
[h,(l -m)], where m is the fraction of  the 
unit cost of  the public good funded by the 
grantor.  If,  for  example,  the  grantor 
adopted a 1  :1 matching grant, this would 
imply that m=  9,  or that the effective tax- 
price to the individual is now: 
hi(l - nc) = Izj(1 - $)  = $hi. 
Private 
Good 
Public 
Good 
A matching grant to the community thus 
reduces the tax-price per unit to each tax- 
payer by the fraction m.As a result of  the 
grant, the community  will,  by  majority 
rule, select a new- level of provision  of  the 
public good  which  sve  indicate  by  GI in 
Figure  4.  In  this particular  case, our ith 
person  ends  up  consuming  OGI  of  the 
public good and OP1 of  the private good. 
It is easy  in this case  to see how  the 
central government could have generated 
this  same equilibriuin  state of  the  com-
munity by dealing directly with the indi- 
vidual members rather than by a matching 
intergoveriimental  grant.  In  particular, 
suppose  that the central government  re-
funded  directly  to  each  individual  the 
fraction m  of  his local  tax payment.  Or, 
perhaps  more  realistically,  the  central 
government inight allow the ith individual 
a credit of  (nzT,) against his tax bill from 
the central government, where Ti is the ith 
person's  local tax bill. In either case, the 
effect  on  each  individual  in  the  com-
munity would be identical to that result- 
ing from an intergovernmental  matching 
grant  where  the  central  government 
funded the fraction m of  the local budget. 
In all  these  cases,  the  resulting  budget 
constraint for  each  individual  and hence 
his voting pattern would be the same. It 
is thus clear that the median peak of  pre- 
ferred  budgets would be  OG1 in  Figure 4 446  AMERICAN ECONOMIC  ASSOCIATION 
for all these alternatives. ll'ithin our model 
of  simple  majority  voting  with fixed  tax 
shares,  an  intergovernmental  matching 
grant in which the grantor pays x  percent 
of  the local expenditure on the public good 
is  therefore  precisely  equivalent  both  in 
terms of  its effect on the public budget and 
on the disposable income of  each person in 
the community to a refund  to each indi- 
vidual of  .z: percent of  his local tax bill. 
On the basis of  the preceeding analysis, 
we  are now i11  a position to compare the 
effects of  equal-size matching  and lump- 
sum grants 011 the level of  the public bud- 
get. Consider  first in Figure 5 the effects 
on  the  ith  person  of  a  matching-grant 
program  to  the  community  where  the 
fraction  nz  again represents the grantor's 
0  Go  GI  B J  C 
Public 
Good 
share  of  local  public  expenditures  and 
which  results  in  an  increase  in  public 
spending from OGoto OG1.  In this case the 
implicit  grant to the  ith individual  (i.e., 
the rebate on his local taxes that he would 
have  received  from  the  central  govern- 
ment under  a program equivalent to the 
matching grant) is the distance EF. The 
grant to the community would thus equal 
Z(EFi),which (as indicated earlier) is the 
distance EK. 
Suppose next that, instead of  a matching 
grant  to  the  community,  the  central 
government  chose  to make  a  lump-sum 
intergovernmental grant of  this same sum, 
EK.  From our earlier  analysis, it is clear 
that this would be precisely equivalent to 
a set of  lump-sum  grants directly to the 
individuals in the con~munity  such that the 
size of  each person's grant is proportional 
to his  local  tax  share; in  Figure  5, for 
example, the ithindividual would  receive 
a lump-sum grant of  EF. This would shift 
the  individual's  budget  line  up  by  the 
distance EF to the new  budget line HJ. 
We can now see that in this model, lump- 
sum  and  matching  intergovernmental 
grants of  the same  total sum have  pre- 
cisely the same implicit pattern of  grants to 
the individual members of  the community: 
they both imply a distribution of  the grant 
funds among individuals in proportion to 
each individual's local tax share. The differ- 
ence is that the matching grant has a price 
effect as well as an income effect, whereas 
the  lump-sum  grant  results  only  in  an 
income effect. 
With  the  result,  we  can  now  prove 
that  under  simple  majority  rule  with 
fixed tax shares, a matching intergovern- 
mental grant will always produce a larger 
expenditure on the public good than will a 
lump-sum grant of  the same amount. On 
first glance, it might appear that we could 
simply invoke the analysis of  grants in the 
model of  individual choice and argue that 
the  ia individual will always prefer a larger 
public budget under the intergovernmental 
matching  grant  than under  a  lump-sum 
grant of  the same size because the match- 
ing-grant  has a  favorable price  effect  in 
addition to an income effect. Since, there- 
fore,  all  persons  prefer  a  larger  public 
budget, the median of  the most-preferred 
budgets will obviously also be larger. This, 
however, is not quite true. 
This argument is valid  for the median 
voter.  In this case,  the equilibrium  local 
budget is his most preferred budget so that, 
under the matching grant in Figure 5, he 
would have an indifference curve tangent 
to AC  at  this point, F. The argument from 
the model  of  individual choice clearly  is 447  POLITICAL  DECENTRALIZATION 
applicable  in  this instance; a  lump-sum 
grant to him of  EF (or, equivalently, an 
intergovernmental lump-sum grant of  EK) 
would  lead  him  to a  most-preferred  pro- 
vision of  the public good which is smaller 
than that under the matching-grant  pro- 
gram. 
Consider  next,  however,  the  case  in 
Figure 6 where  an individual's most-pre- 
ferred budget under the matching grant is 
indicated by point  M,  a budget which is 
less than that of  the median voter. In this 
instance,  it  is  possible  that  this person 
Private 
Good 
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Good 
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could  prefer  a  larger  budget  (e.g.,  that 
indicated by point N)  if  the community 
received  a  lump-sum  grant  of  EK  than 
under the matching-grant program.  This 
can occur because the individual's implied 
grant,  EF,  under  the  lump-sum  inter-
governmental  grant exceeds  the implicit 
sum  he  would  receive  under  his  most-
preferred  budget  under  the  matching 
grant. In  this case, the added income effect 
of  the larger implicit lump-sum grant may 
be  stronger  than  the  substitution  effect 
of  the hypothetical matching grant. Note, 
however,  and this is crucial to the argu- 
ment, that, although such a person's most- 
preferred  budget may be larger under the 
lump-sum intergovernmental grant, it will 
never be as large as the equilibrium budget 
under the matching grant. It  is clear from 
the geometry in Figure 6 that the tangency 
of  an indifference curve with a budget line 
under  the lump-sum  grant must  always 
occur on a curve which is higher than that 
which passes through M, and this means 
that the point N must always lie to the 
left of  F. 
We  have  shown,  therefore,  that  all 
voters with most-preferred public budgets 
less than the median under the matching 
grant  will  continue  to vote  for  budgets 
under  the  lump-sum  grant  which  are 
smaller than the equilibrium budget under 
the  original  matching  grant.  Since  the 
model of  individual choice shows that the 
median  voter  under  the matching  grant 
will  himself  prefer  a  smaller  budget 
under the lump-sum grant, it follows that 
the median  of  the most-preferred  public 
budgets will be smaller under a lump-sum 
intergovernmental  grant  than  with  a 
matching-grant  program  of  the  same 
amount. It is, incidentally, easy to see that 
people who prefer relatively large budgets 
under the matching grant (e.g., like point 
R in Figure 6) will generally prefer smaller 
budgets  under  the lump-sum grant.  For 
these individuals, the most-preferred bud- 
get  under  the matching grant  implies  a 
larger  income  effect  than  the lump-sum 
grant, as well as the price effect. 
IV. Some Further Thoughts 
In Section 111, we were able to employ 
our  analytic  framework  to  reach  some 
specific conclusions concerning the alloca- 
tive  and  distributive  effects  of  inter-
governmental  matching  and  lump-sum 
grants for the case of  simple majority rule 
with fixed tax shares. While we  feel that 
these results are of  some interest in them- 
selves, they are obviously quite limited in a 
number of  respects. Besides applying to a 
single  collective  decision  rule,  they  are 
derived  in  a  model  which  assumes  con-
vexity of  preferences, a single public good, 
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This raises the issue of  the extent of the 
generality of  these results. We might men- 
tion that, although we have decided not to 
burden  the  reader  with  another  special 
case, we have been able to prove that the 
results derived in section 111also follow for 
the case of  the Lindahl budget-determina- 
tion model under the assumption that the 
collective activity is a normal good. Aside 
from  this,  however,  we  can  report  oill~ 
somewhat uneven progresq in our attempts 
to  generalize these propositions cor-icerning 
lump-sum and matching grants. 
In our earlier  paper,  we  were  able  to 
demonstrate the basic theorein of  the esis- 
tence of  a set of  individual lump-sum grants 
which is equivalent  to a lump-sum grant 
to the collectivity  as a whole for a fairly 
broad class of  collective decision procesces 
in which there are any number of  collec- 
tive goods and in which there are virtually 
no  restrictions on the properties of  indi- 
vidual preferences.  The same formal anal- 
ysis implies that, for this same broad class 
of  political processes, there exists a set of 
tax credits to individuals and lump-sum 
redistributive  payments within  the com-
munity which would duplicate the alloca- 
tive and distributive effects  of  any par- 
ticular intergovernmental matching-grant 
program. 
These  propositions  concern  political 
choices within  a  given  set  of  alternative 
states. The principal concern of  this paper, 
on the other hand, is the comparison  of 
choices  made  under  different  sets  of 
feasible states, a comparison of  the choice 
made  among  the  alternatives  available 
under  a  matching grant with that made 
from  the  different  set  of  states possible 
under a lump-sum grant. The restrictions 
which we placed upon the political process 
in  our  earlier  paper  seem, we  feel,  both 
plausiblc and not obviously equivalent to 
the conclusions expressed in the proposi- 
tions.  However, to compare  outcomes in 
different feasible  sets requires further as- 
sumptions about the political process, and 
it remains an open question whether there 
are reasonable and interesting restrictions 
which  will  ensure  in  general  the  result 
derived  for  the  particular  case  in  this 
paper. 
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